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INDIAN LAW IN PROPERTY: JOHNSON V.
M'INTOSH AND BEYOND

Kenneth H. Bobroff*
First-year law students are most likely to encounter Indian law in
their Property class.' Indeed, one of the foundational Indian law cases,
Johnson v. M'Intosh,2 is at the root of title for most real property in the
United States. 3 A good number of Property casebooks include this 178
year-old decision, often as the first case of the semester.4 Indian law,
however, is a much richer source for the Property teacher than just
M'Intosh. Using Indian law materials throughout the first-year Property
class allows students to see in sharp relief how a society's values and
principles are embedded in its property rules and how judges and
lawmakers make policy and philosophical choices through the property
rules they adopt and impose on others.5 This Article will discuss using
* Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. A-B. 1986, Princeton
University; M.Phil. 1988, Oxford University; J.D. 1994, Stanford Law School. Warm
thanks to my colleagues Christian Fritz and Emlen S. Hall.
1. This Article uses the terms "Indian," "native," "Native American," and "indigenous" to
refer to the indigenous peoples who have occupied the land that is now the United States
since before European and United States colonization. My recent experience is that both
"Indian" and "Native American" are widely used by native people themselves, with the
former more common the closer one is to Indian Country and the latter more widespread in
non-Indian institutions.
Specific tribal names are preferred when appropriate and
sufficient The term "Native" (both capitalized and not) is increasingly used among native
activists and intellectuals.
2. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
3. Real property in Hawaii and lands in the southwestern United States acquired from
Mexico do not trace title directly back to Johnson v. M'Intosh. On Hawaiian land titles, see
generally Lilikala Kame'eleihiwa, Native Land and Foreign Desires (Bishop Museum Press
1992); Linda S. Parker, Native American Estate: The Struggle over Indian and Hawaiian
Lands 87-131 (U. of Haw. Press 1989). On title to lands formerly held by Mexico, see
Guadalupe T. Luna, Chicana/ChicanoLand Tenure In Vhe Agrarian Domain: On The Edge
OfA "NakedKnife," 4 Mich. J. Race & L. 39 (1998).
4. See e.g. Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 3 (4th ed., Aspen 1998);
Joseph William Singer, Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices25 (2d ed., Aspen 1997);
Richard H. Chused, Cases,Materials, and Problems in Property 6 (2d ed., Matthew Bender
1999); Sheldon F. Kurtz & Herbert Hovenkamp, Cases and Materialson American Property
Law 68 (3d ed., West Wadsworth 1999); John P. Dwyer & Peter S. Menell, Property Law
and Policy: A ComparativeInstitutionalPerspective (Found. Press 1998). Singer's casebook
provides the most comprehensive treatment of M'Intosh and Native American property
issues generally, both past and present. Its Teacher's Manual is especially helpful.
5. Professor Frank Pommersheim argues eloquently for teaching Indian law more
broadly if we are to achieve justice and democracy in the United States' relations with
Native Americans:
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Indian law materials during a typical first semester Property course.
First, it will discuss teaching Johnson v. M'Intosh in conjunction with
two other cases: another nineteenth century property law opinion by
Chief Justice Marshall, United States v. Percheman,6 and a 1955 decision
on the taking of Alaska Indian land, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States.7 Second, the Article will suggest supplementing the fox case,
Piersonv. Post,8 with a short reading about a Laguna Pueblo deer hunt
from Leslie Marmon Silko's classic novel, Ceremony.9 Finally, the Article
will advocate considering American Indian conceptions of property in
land when other philosophical justifications for property are discussed.
Although a seminal case for Federal Indian law, the parties in
M'Intosh included no Indians, at least not in the courtroom. Rather the
case was a title dispute between non-Indian claimants, all of whom
traced their title to purchase from the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians.10
The plaintiffs, denominated Johnson and Graham's Lessee so the case
could be heard as an ejectment action, traced title to two land
speculation syndicates, the Illinois Company and the Wabash Company,
which had each purchased large sections of the present-day State of
Illinois directly from the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians in 1773 and
1775 for expressed consideration totaling $54,000." The defendant,

You can only have democracy when you have informed citizens. We cannot have
democracy in Indian law right now because we do not have Indian law literacy. It
is foolhardy to say the democratic process can really work in the context of Indian
law at this time because we do not have enough literate people on the courts, in
Congress, and in state legislatures. I am not saying this to disparage people, but
rather as an accurate assessment of where people are in their current Indian law
understanding... . If we advance Indian law literacy, true democracy in the
context of tribal-federal relations might actually flourish, might actually work for
the first time in a way that is mutually respectful and agreeable to all involved.
This then is the challenge and dream that confronts us.
Frank Pommersheim, What Must Be Done To Achieve The Vision Of The Twenty-First
Century Tribal Judiciary, 7-WTR Kan. J. L. & Pub. Poly. 8 (1997); Frank Pommersheim,
Democracy, Citizenship, And Indian Law Literacy: Some Initial Thoughts, 14 T.M. Cooley L.
Rev. 457 (1997) (concentrating instead on the narrower pedagogical advantages that Indian
law cases and perspectives bring to the teaching of property law).
6. 39 U.S. 51 (1833).
7. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
8. 3 Cai. R 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805).
9. Leslie Marmon Silko, Ceremony (Penguin 1977).
10. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 550-62, 593-94. Teachers should be careful to make sure that
the version of the case they assign includes the critical information that the United States
had also purchased the land in question from the Indians. See e.g. Singer, supra n. 4, at
28. Authors of several popular casebooks have chosen to simplify the case by excising this
point. See e.g. Dukeminier & Krier, supra n. 4, at 10. Professor Eric Kades has written
the most complete and easily accessible account of the Illinois and Wabash companies, the
land cessions and purchases, the litigation, and the Congressional lobbying efforts
preceding the lawsuit. See Eric Kades, History and Interpretationof the Great Case of
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 19 Law & Hist. Rev. 67, 81, 95 (2001). His article is essential reading
for providing answers to questions that a "beginner's mind" asks but that Marshall's
opinion does not answer. I would suggest making it available to students, at least as
recommended reading.
11. See Eric Kades, History and Interpretationof the Great Case of Johnson v. M'Intosh,
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William M'Intosh, traced his title to his purchase of 11,560 acres from
the United States in 1818. The United States, in turn, had received the
lands by treaties of cession from the same and other Indians, after the
grants to the Illinois and Wabash companies. 12 The case was quite
important in its day-Daniel Webster argued for the plaintiffs-and
settled an important issue for the new nation, namely whether land
speculators who had purchased land from Indian tribes held good (and3
western land.1
immensely valuable) title to much of the new nation's
Stylistically, the opinion is fascinating, presenting Chief Justice Marshall
knowingly defending the indefensible, and it encourages students to read
cases critically and carefully.
Substantively, the case is extraordinarily rich for initiating
discussion of many-if not most of the basic themes of the first year
Property class. As the justification for the root of land titles in the
United States, studying M'Intosh raises the issue of the initial creation of
property rights, whether by "Discovery" or judicial fiat. It necessarily
requires addressing the role of state power in defining property rights
and whether that power resides in Indian tribes or Federal courts. It
examines "possession" as a rationale for creating property rights and
implicates various philosophical justifications and explanations for doing
so. The case provides an ideal opportunity to discuss the classic
Lockean justification for property rights and to introduce Legal Realist,
Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, and Law and Economics
perspectives on creating property rights in land. It introduces the
concept of chain of title and thinking about property as a bundle of
rights. Indeed, the challenge in teaching M'Intosh is often choosing
among potential themes so as not to overwhelm beginning law students.
However, teaching M'Intosh in isolation allows students to dismiss
the case as an interesting historic relic, with little to contribute to a
modem understanding of Property. Teaching it alongside the case of
United States v. Percheman encourages students to compare reasoning,
rationales, and policy considerations used by judges in choosing among
potential property rules just as they will see judges doing throughout
their first semester Property course. In Percheman, a former Spanish
subject sought to confirm title to 2000 acres granted him by Spain

19 Law & Hist. Rev. 67, 81-85, 100-01.
12. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 593-94. Interestingly, Marshall's opinion does not specify the
treaties by which the U.S. obtained the land. See Kades, supra n. 11, at 54 (citing various
treaties: 7 Stat. 81 (Delware; 1804); 7 Stat. 83 (Piankashaws; 1804); 7 Stat. 91, 100
(Miamis; 1805); 7 Stat. 113 (Miamis including Eel Rivers, Delawares, and Potowatomis;
1809); 7 Stat. 116 (Weas; 1809); 7 Stat. 117 (Kickapoos; 1809)).
13. For the best critical analysis of M'Intosh, see generally Russell Lawrence Barsh &
James Youngblood Henderson, The Road. Indian Tribes and Political Liberty (U. of Calif.
Press 1980); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought:
Discourses of Conquest (Oxford U. Press); Milner S. Ball, The Constitution, Courts, Indian
Tribes, 1987 A.B.F. Research J. 1 (1987).
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before it ceded Florida to the United States by treaty in 1819.14 From the
perspective of Property law, the specific question in each case was
similar: whether title granted by a sovereign that subsequently ceded the
lands to the United States could be confirmed in Federal courts? The
key difference between the cases, of course, was that the sovereign in
Perchemanwas a European state, not an Indian tribe, a distinction that
likely explains Chief Justice Marshal's opinion which reached a
conclusion opposite from (and without acknowledging) the one he had
reached ten years earlier in M'Intosh.
Marshall framed his opinion in M'Intosh as an inquiry into "the
power of the Indians to give, and of private individuals to receive, a title
which can be sustained in the Courts of this country." 5 He began by
stating that because a society's right to prescribe property rules is
unquestionable, his judicial inquiry must go beyond "principles of
abstract justice" to consider the government's actual practice with
regard to Indian lands. 16 After a self-consciously ironic defense of the
"potentates of the old world" appropriating to themselves the New
World, ' 7 Marshall articulated the "Discovery" principle to justify voiding
the Indian tribes' land transfers to Johnson and Graham's
predecessors.'8
European discovery, Marshall wrote, "gave title to the government
by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other
European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession." 9 According to Marshall, this title "necessarily" gave the
discovering nation the exclusive right of acquiring the lands from the
Indians, vis-a-vis other European nations.20 Relations resulting between
the natives and the discovering nation were matters to be regulated only
among themselves. 2 ' In these relations, the Indians' rights were not
"entirely disregarded," but were, again "necessarily," "to a considerable
extent, impaired." 22 Indians could legally and equitably occupy the land
and use it as they wished, but "their rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, were necessarily diminished."23 With European
discovery, Indians lost the property right to alienate their land to
whomever they wished; such right was inconsistent with the
"fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who
14. I am indebted to my colleague and fellow Property teacher Emlen Hall for bringing
this case to my attention.
15. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 572.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 573.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 573.
22. Id. at 574.
23. Id.
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made it." 24
Marshal's ultimate rationale for holding European title superior to
Indian title began with historical practice and ended in tautology:
The validity of the titles given by [the crown or its grantees while the states
were colonies] has never been questioned in our Courts. It has been
exercised uniformly over territory in possession of the Indians. The
existence of this power must negative the existence of any right which my
conflict with, and control it. An absolute title to lands cannot exist, at the
same time, in different persons, or in different governments. An absolute
title, must be exclusive title, or at least a title which excludes all others
not compatible with it. All our institutions recognise the absolute title of
the crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and recognise the
absolute right of the crown to extinguish that right. This is incompatible
with an absolute and complete title in the Indians.25
After a long historical description asserting that the Discovery
principle had long been universally recognized-the universe apparently
not including Indian tribes -Marshall considered the justice of the claim
he asserted. He found "some excuse, if not justification, in the character
them."26
and habits of the people whose rights have been wrested from
The "savages," Marshall concluded, were too fierce to be incorporated
into the conquering nation like civilized peoples. 7 The Europeans had
to adopt property rules adapted to "the actual state of things" and
recognizing "absolute" title in the Indians, according to Marshall, would
have meant abandoning the country.2 In the case at hand, this meant
had to be denied.
that the Indians' right to transfer title to their lands
29
Marshall concluded that there was no other choice:
However this restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to the
usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under
which the country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual
by reason, and
condition of the two people, it may, perhaps be3 supported
0
certainly cannot be rejected by Courts ofjustice
Unraveling Marshall's argument is not easy and helping students
figure it out is even harder. Recent scholarship has provided some
insights that make the opinion more intelligible and are particularly

24. Id.
25. Id. at 587-88. For the view that the fictions of "discovery" and "absolute title" had
(and have) no legal effect on the tribes' title, see Ball, supran. 13, at 23-28, 24 n. 132, 29.
26. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 589.
27. Id As David Wilklns notes, the use of the doctrine of conquest is particularly
problematic since Indian nations lost very little of their land by conquest, at least in the
legal sense. See David Wilkns, Quit-Claiming the Doctrine of Discovery: A Treaty-Based
Reappraisal.23 Okla. City L. Rev. 277, 280-81 (1988); Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of
the Sovereign:AboriginalTitle Reconsidered, 31 Hastings L.J. 1215 (1980).
28. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 591.
29. See Williams, supra n. 13.
30. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 591-92.
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useful for the Property teacher using the case. Milner Ball has focused
attention away from what was long the conventional understanding of
the case to what Marshall called "another view... of this question,
which deserves to be considered."3 1 This view acknowledged the Indian
tribes' right to make and alter their property laws and, specifically, the
right to make grants under those laws. If, however, tribes revoked such
grants and made a different disposition of the land, the spumed
purchaser had no recourse to any tribunal but an Indian one: "a person
who purchases land from the Indians, within their territory, incorporates
himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased; holds their
title under protection, and subject to their laws."32 The courts of the
United States were unavailable. The tribes' subsequent cessions of the
same land to the United States extinguished the initial transfer and the
purchaser was left, legally, with nothing.
Similarly helpful in understanding the strands of the opinion is
David Wilkins' work inquiring into what Marshall called "the actual state
of things." In Marshall's view, the discovery doctrine somehow deprived
the Indians of absolute title to their lands, giving absolute title to the
discovering nation or its successors. Wlkins emphasizes what Marshall
merely mentions that the discovery doctrine applied only among
European nations themselves.
In their treaty relations with Indian
nations, all the Europeans recognized that the Indians had the complete
right-absent conquest in a just war-to decide whether or not to part
with their land.3 3 In Wilkin's view, the historical record does not support
Marshall's transformation of discovery into ownership.
Eric Kades argues that Marshall was making a two-level analysis.34
First, discovery gave the United States the right of purchase, exclusive of
all other European nations.3 5
Second, the discovering nations
established their own rules governing how that right or purchase would
be exercised and by long-held custom and innumerable statutes, only
the sovereign could purchase land from the Indians. 36 In recognizing
this custom, Marshall assured that no one would compete for land
purchase, meaning the sovereign would be protected from bidding and
guaranteed the lowest price possible. 7
But the result Marshall reached in Percheman ten years later
suggests that there may well have been a choice, at least a legal one. 8
31. Id. at593-94.
32. Milner S. Ball, John Marshall and Indian Nations in the Beginning and Now. 33 John
Marshall L. Rev. 1183, 1188 (2000) (citing Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 593).
33. Wilkins, supran.27, at 298-312.
34. Kades, supra n. 11, at 70-71.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 106-12. But see Mitchel v. U.S., 34 U.S. 711 (1835) (upholding transfer of land
by the Seminole Nation to a private company that was subsequently confn-med by Spain).
37. Kades, supran. 11, at 111-13.
38. U.S. v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833).
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The relevant facts in this later case were similar to those in M'Intosh,
with two important exceptions. The first difference is that the sovereign
that had transferred title to the land in question was a European nation,
not an Indian tribe. In 1815, Spain, through its governor, had granted
Spanish military officer Juan Percheman 2000 acres of land at a place
called Ockliwaha in East Florida.39 Three years later, Spain ceded its
Florida colony to the United States by treaty. 40 In 1830, Percheman had
sought to confirm his title in a Federal court.
The second difference-and one which makes the case particularly
interesting and somewhat challenging for first year students-is that
the Court's determination of title in Percheman ultimately turned as
much upon jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and Congressional intent
as it did upon any aspect of property law. Because federal court
jurisdiction did not extend to suits against the sovereign, the only way
Percheman could bring his claim was if Congress had conferred
jurisdiction by specific statute. 41
Following the treaty cession from
Spain, the United States Congress had passed several acts to address
42
private land claims in the acquired territories.
Specifically, the act of
May 23, 1828 provided for private land claims to be presented to a board
of commissioners for ascertainment and confirmation; 43 the act of May
26, 1830 submitted to federal court any claims that had not been "finally
acted upon" at the time of passage of the act.44 Since Percheman's claim
had been rejected by the board of commissioners, the Federal court only
had jurisdiction to hear his claim if the board's rejection of his title was
not what Congress had meant in the latter act by the words "finally
45
acted upon."
In deciding whether Congress had intended the board of
commissioners to be an investigatory panel recommending confirmation
of titles or an adjudicatory court making determinations of title,46 Chief
Justice Marshall first considered the effect of Spain's cession of Florida
upon the titles to land the King had already granted. His analysis is
worth quoting extensively:
The modem usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated;
that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the
whole civilized world would be outraged, if private property should be
generally confiscated, and private rights annulled. The people change

39. Id. at 82 (the Court made no inquiry into how Spain acquired title).
40. Id. at 86.
41. Id. at 85-86.
42. Id.
43. Perchemarn,32 U.S. at 85-86. Note the act of May 8, 1822, which established the
process for confirming Florida land claims. Percheman,32 U.S. at 89-90.
44. Id. at 86.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 90.
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their allegiance; their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but
their relations to each other, and their rights of property remain
undisturbed. If this be the modem rule, even in cases of conquest, who
can doubt its application to the case of an amicable cession of
territory?... A cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of
the property belonging to its inhabitants. The king cedes that only which
belonged to him; lands he previously granted, were not his to cede.
Neither party could so understand the cession. Neither party could
consider itself as attempting a wrong to individuals condemned by the
practice of the whole civilized world. The cession of a territory by its name
from one sovereign to another, conveying the compound idea of
surrendering at the same time the lands and the people who inhabit them,
would be necessarily understood to pass the sovereignty only, and not to
interfere with private property.4 7

This clear rule, that a sovereign's cession did not affect private land
title, argued, according to Marshall, that neither the diplomats
negotiating the treaty of cession 48 nor Congress in passing the various
title confirmation acts could have intended for "real titles" to be subject
to invalidation upon cursory examination by a board of commissioners.4 9
Thus, he concluded, no determination of title was "finally acted upon"
until it was confirmed or rejected by Congress.50 Percheman's title,
granted by the King of Spain and confirmed by the District Court, was
valid.
Reading M'Intosh and Percheman early in the first year Property
course exposes students to how government institutions -executive,
legislative, and judicial-determine the character and extent of property
rights. Reading the cases side-by-side, or at least serially, shows starkly
how Marshall applied assumptions about race and culture to establish
and secure rights in land. Moreover, studying the cases together
deprives students of the facile dismissal of them as irrelevant products of
a different historic age. Rather, it encourages them to make a close
reading of the cases to determine how Marshall reached his opposite
conclusions.
Adding a more recent decision on Indian property rights, Tee-HitTon Indians v. United States, 51 to the Property I syllabus accomplishes
two objectives.
First, it offers students an introduction to Fifth
Amendment "takings" issues that illustrates the preliminary question in
47. Id. at 86-87.
48. Percheman, 32 U.S. at 88-89. In holding the treaty language, which expressly
protected grants from the Spanish Crown, self-executing, Marshall relied upon the Spanish
language version of the treaty. See Percheman argument, id. at 69 (noting that the
Spanish version, quedaron artificadosmeans that the titles were to continue acknowledged
and confirmed). Percheman's counsel argued for an interpretation based on the treaty's
use of the feminine pronoun.
49. Id. at 91-92.
50. Id.
51. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. U.S., 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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takings jurisprudence of whether a particular interest is sufficiently
"property" to require compensation for its confiscation by the
government.
Second, it shows students how judges apply (and
misapply) precedent and consider policy implications in reaching
decisions about property law. 52
In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, decided in 1955 and prefiguring the current
Supreme Court's Indian law jurisprudence, a clan of Tlingit Indians
claimed compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
for the cutting of timber on their ancestral lands in and around the
Tongass National Forest in Alaska. 53 The Court held that Indian title not
explicitly recognized by treaty or legislation was not a sufficient property
interest to merit compensation for government taking under the Fifth
Amendment. s4 The Court described Indian title as follows:
It is well settled that in all the States of the Union the tribes who inhabited
the lands of the States held claim to such lands after the coming of the
white man, under what is sometimes termed original Indian title or
permission from the whites to occupy. That description means mere
possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress. After
conquest they were permitted to occupy portions of territory over which
they had previously exercised 'sovereignty,' as we use that term. This is
not a property right but amounts to a right of occupancy which the
sovereign grants and protects against intrusion by third parties but which
right of occupancy may be terminated and such lands fully disposed of by
the sovereign itself without any legally enforceable obligation to
compensate the Indians.5 5
Justice Reed, writing for the majority,5 6 justified this description of
Indian title upon the theories of discovery and conquest and, especially,
the "great case of Johnson v. M'Intosh."5 7 According to Reed, the inferior
Indian title had "long been rationalized by the legal theory that discovery
and conquest gave the conquerors sovereignty over and ownership of the
lands thus obtained."5 8 M'Intosh, he argued, had "confirmed the practice
of two hundred years of American history 'that discovery gave an
exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by
purchase or by conquest.'"59
Reed then quoted extensively from

52. The two most useful sources for background and critical analysis of Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians are Newton, supra n. 27 and Joseph William Singer, Property and Sovereignty, 86
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
53. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 273.
54. Id. at 285.
55. Id. at 279.
56. Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Frankfurter dissented,
but only as to whether Congress had recognized the Indians' title in the Organic Act for
Alaska, 23 Stat. 24 (1884). Tee-Hit-Ton Indians,348 U.S. at 294.
57. Id. at 279.
58. Id. (citing 1 Wheaton's International Law, ch. V.).
59. Id. at 280 (citing Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 587).
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Marshall's opinion denying the "Courts of the conqueror" authority to
decide, "on abstract principles" the right of "agriculturalists, merchants,
and manufacturers" to "expel hunters from the territory they possess. " 6°
In this series of rhetorical moves, Justice Reed stretched the
holding in M'Intosh far beyond the facts in the case and deployed
language from the opinion to justify a result that it never called for. In
M'Intosh, the Court effectively split Indian title in two: discovery gave the
United States "absolute" (also called "exclusive") title to Indian lands,
leaving tribes with a right of occupancy, a right which could be acquired
either by purchase or by conquest, but only by the United States. The
specific issue before the Marshall Court-the validity of Indians' grants
to the United States versus earlier grants to private individualsrequired no judgment upon the nature of the Indians' right of
occupancy, including whether it could be characterized as a property
right. In fact, Marshall noted, that "Indian title of occupancy... is no
more incompatible with a seisin in fee, than a lease for years, and might
as effectually bar an ejectment." 61 In his mind, it would seem, the
Indians' interest was substantial and subject to protection, even in "the
" 62
courts of the conqueror.
Justice Reed relied upon language Marshall had used to justify
Europeans' claim of "absolute title" in order to support his own claim
that Conquest had deprived Indians of all property rights in their land.
"Conquest," Reed quoted Marshall, "gives a title which the Courts of the
conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of
individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has
been successfully asserted. " 63 While Marshall had used this language to
justify taking "absolute" title from the Indians, 64 Reed's discussion
concluded that it had left them no title at all, certainly no title that had
to be respected by the United States:
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent
were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the
Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and
trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will that deprived them of
their land.65

60. Id.
61. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 592.
62. Id. at 590.
63. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 280 (citing Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 590-9 1).
64. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 588-89.
65. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 290. Justice Reed's assertion that most aboriginal
title was acquired by conquest has been hotly contested. See Felix Cohen, Original Indian
Title, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 28, 34-35 (1947) (arguing that what "e]very American schoolboy is
taught... the historic fact is that practically all of the real estate acquired by the United
States since 1776 was purchased not from Napoleon or any other emperor or czar but from
its original Indian Owners") (quoted by Newton, supran. 27, at 1215); Newton, supra n. 27,
at 1241-44 ("The only sovereign act that can be said to have conquered the Alaska native
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Lawyers for the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians tried to argue that their land
66
use was not like that of "the nomadic tribes of the States Indians."
They asserted that "their stage of civilization and their concept of
ownership of property" made the rules for American Indian land
inapplicable in Alaska.67 Justice Reed, however, pointed to the small
number of Tee-Hit-Tons (65 members), 68 the large territory they claimed
(350,000 acres), 69 their tribal, not individual, land ownership, 70 and their
use of the land, specifically their movement about the territory as game
and fish became scarce.7 ' This, Reed concluded, showed that the TeeHit-Tons were in a hunting and fishing state of civilization and that their
use of the land was like that of the nomadic Indians to the south.7 2
Accordingly, their title need not be respected.
The more convincing reasons for Justice Reed's opinion are in his
discussion of the policy implications of the decision. In footnote
seventeen, Reed noted that the Tee-Hit-Tons' claim would reach fourteen
million dollars with interest and that other pending claims based upon
the Fifth Amendment totaled nine billion dollars.7 3
Even more
fundamental, however, is Justice Reed's conclusion:
In the light of the history of Indian relations in this Nation, no other
course would meet the problem of the growth of the United States except
to make congressional contributions for Indian lands rather than to
subject the Government to an obligation to pay the value when taken with
interest to the date of payment. Our conclusion does not uphold
harshness as against tenderness toward the Indians, but it leaves with
Congress, where it belongs, the policy of Indian gratuities for the
termination of Indian occupancy of Government-owned land rather than
making compensation for its value a rigid constitutional principle. 74
In both M'Intosh and Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, the Court used fanciful
descriptions of Indians' use of land (and implicitly Indians' property
laws) to support its diminishment of tribal property rights.7 5 Only a
was the Tee-Hit-Ton opinion itself.").
66. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians,348 U.S. at 285, 288.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 286.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 287.
71. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians,348 U.S. at 287.
72. Id. at 286-87.
73. Id. at 285.
Dean Newton has pointed out the exaggeration in the Federal
government's estimate. Newton, supran. 27, at 1248-49. She argues that a more realistic
estimate of the United States liability, including interest would have bee slightly over $1
billion dollars. Id.
74. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians,348 U.S. at 290-91.
75. See M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 590-91 ("[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were
fierce savages.., whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in
possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness....
As the white
population advanced, that of the Indians necessarily receded.
The country in the
immediate neighborhood of agriculturists became unfit for them. The game fled into
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limited understanding of the diversity of indigenous societies and their
means of productions is needed to realize just how romantic and
stereotypical the Court's descriptions were.76
Exposing students to
accurate descriptions of indigenous conceptions of property that they
can compare with the Anglo-American common law decisions in their
casebook highlights the role embedded values have in any given property
rights system and foregrounds the extent to which any such system is
the result societal and institutional values and choices.
The early nineteenth-century case of the fox-hunter and saucy
interloper, familiar to generations of law students, offers an opportunity
at the beginning of the Property course to consider an indigenous
perspective on the values embedded in law of capture as applied to wild
animals. At issue in Pierson v. Post, of course, was which of two
pursuers owned a fleeing fox: the hunter, who chased the fox with dogs
and hounds under his command, or the passer-by, who intervened,
killed the fox, and carried it off.7 7 Leslie Marmon Silko, in her classic
novel, Ceremony, described the killing and butchering of a dear by four
young Laguna Pueblo hunters around the Second World War. 78 In
Silko's story, there is no mention of which hunter actually shot the deer.
One guts it and cleans it, another takes the liver and heart. The two
others sprinkle cornmeal on the dead animal's nose, feeding its spirit
and demonstrating their love and respect in the belief that to do
otherwise might offend the deer and risk its absence the following year.
All understand that after they carry it back to the Pueblo, the deer will
be laid out on a Navajo blanket, with turquoise around its neck and
silver and turquoise on its antlers, with a bowl of cornmeal nearby. As
the hunter carries the deer's liver and heart home in a clean cheesecloth,
he reflects: "They said the deer gave itself to them because it loved them,
and he could feel the love as the fading heat of the deer's body warmed
his hands."79
I assign my students Silko's piece after we've spent a class parsing
and dissecting the four and a half pages of Pierson v. Post. I ask them to
contrast the values reflected in her story with those in the judges'
majority and dissenting opinions. I then ask them to suggest what they
thicker and more unbroken forests, and the Indians followed."); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348
U.S. at 287-88 ("[T]he Tee-Hit-Tons were in a hunting and fishing stage of civilization, with
shelters fitted to their environment, and claims to rights to use identified territory for these
activities as well as the gathering of wild products of the earth.... [T]he petitioner's use of
its lands was like the use of the nomadic tribes of the States Indians.").
76. For a description of Indian property laws based upon historical accounts and
anthropological reports, see generally Kenneth Bobroff, Re-telling Allotment. IndianProperty
Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1559 (2001).
77. 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805) (reprinted in Singer, supran.4, at 51).
78. Silko, supra n. 9, at 50-52. Silko, who attended law school at the University of New
Mexico before publishing Ceremony, was almost certainly familiar with Pierson v. Post
which would have been routinely taught in the first year Property course.
79. Id. at 52.
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think a property law system for hunting deer might look like for a society
with values similar to those depicted by Silko. Finally, I ask them to
propose a property law system that would reflect other values, perhaps
those of a rancher, a conservationist, an ecofeminist, a deep ecologist, or
an animal rights proponent. The exercise generates lively discussion
and seems to result in a heightened awareness of how all property laws
reflect value judgements by lawmakers, whether common law judges,
legislators, or regulators.
Native American perspectives on property, particularly on property
in land, provide valuable comparisons to the theoretical perspectives
typically discussed in first-year Property classrooms. First year students
typically read explanations of property ranging from classical writers like
Locke, Bentham, and Blackstone; to modem proponents of Legal
Realism, Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Studies, and Law and
Economics. Property teachers are likely to find indigenous perspectives
on property less accessible and less familiar, but adding several to the
first year syllabus challenges students to think more critically about all
the perspectives they consider.
An obvious caveat is the explicit acknowledgement that there is no
single American Indian perspective on property or even on property in
land. Native societies in the Americas have enjoyed a broad range of
theoretical positions on property and land and have created a wide
variety of property systems.8 0 These have varied across time, regions,
languages, modes of production, and cultures. Almost all indigenous
cultures here have recognized private property in personal goods,
including, among many cultures, intellectual property such as songs,
dances, stories, and curing rituals.8 ' Agricultural societies recognized
the most extensive property rights in land, although most Native
societies located those rights in families or clans and required
maintenance of use for maintenance of ownership. 2
Some Native
peoples in the Americas recognized transfer of property rights, while
others have not. 83 Of course, Indian property systems underwent
tremendous change as a result of European and then United States
colonialization, at least until Indian property laws were federalized,
beginning in 1887. 8 The variety of indigenous property systems, time
constraints and accessibility of sources requires focus on, at best, just a

80. Bobroff, supra n. 76, at 1571-1602 (arguing that an analogy exists for almost every
doctrine of Anglo-American property law including interests similar to easements, licenses,
profits-a-pendre, life estates, leases, timeshares, condominiums, corporate titles, cotenancies, and defeasible fees).
81. Id. at 1573 n. 51.
82. Id. at 1571-1602.
83. Id.
84. See e.g. Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things: Property, Power and the
Transformation of the CreekIndians1733-1816 (U. Chi. Press 1999).
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few. Yet, inclusion of even two or three such perspectives will encourage
students to think more critically about the other property perspectives
they study.
A common misconception is that because Native peoples have
viewed property rights in land differently from their colonizers, they have
recognized no ownership of land at all.8 As William Cronon wrote about
Indians in early New England, "The difference between Indians and
Europeans was not that one had property and the other had none;
rather, it was that they loved property differently."8 6 Archeological and
mostly non-Indian accounts show that Indian families in southern New
England held exclusive rights to their cultivated fields and the land
where their homes stood.87 Landholders had to use the lands to retain
ownership and rights were subject to periodic abandonment as old fields
were exhausted. 8 Any member of a village could use its common lands
for wood and plant gathering, but fishing and trapping sites could be
owned by one person or a family. 89 Indians in early New England
sometimes divided property rights in quite complicated ways, recognizing
an exclusive right to certain resources from a certain place at a certain
time (e.g. taking deer in the winter), but not the right to prohibit others
from taking more plentiful resources from the same place in more
plentiful times (e.g. hunting migratory birds in the spring). 90 "Property
rights," Cronon writes, "shifted with ecological use."91 Like many native
societies in the Americas, Indians in early New England recognized
exclusive rights in land. Like some, they "sliced" property rights more
finely than the typical European bundle and like most, though not all,
they rarely traded property rights in an internal market.
A late nineteenth-century petition to Congress from Hopi village
leaders resisting the imposition of federal title in severalty offers a short,
easily accessible description of a property system adapted to the
challenges of desert agriculture. 93 It is worth quoting extensively:

85. Bobroff, supran. 76, at 1573-74.
86. William Cronon, Changes in the land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New
England 80 (Hill & Wang 1983). Cronon's study of land tenure and land use in early
southern New England is readily available in a paperback edition. Dwyer's and Menel's
casebook includes a "case study" that uses excerpts from Cronon's study and other
secondary sources to compare native and colonial property systems in early New England.
Dwyer & Menell, supran. 4, at 21-56.
87. Cronon, supra n. 86, at 62-64.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 62-67.
92. Bobroff, supran. 76, at 1574 (citing Cronon, supra n. 86, at 62-67).
93. Albert Yava, We Want to Tell You Something, in Native American Testimony 249-50
(Peter Nabakov ed., Viking 1991) (Describing a non-Indian, Tom Keam, who drew up the
letter by hand and had it read to "all the important men in the village." One hundred and
twenty three men, representing practically every clan and family signed the petition.).
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The family, the dwelling house and the field are inseparable, because the
woman is the heart of these, and they rest with her. Among us the family
traces its kin from the mother, hence all its possessions are hers. The
man builds the house but the woman is the owner, because she repairs
and preserves it; the man cultivates the field, but he renders its harvest in
the woman's keeping, because upon her it rests to prepare the food, and
the surplus of stores for barter depends upon her thrift.
A man plants the fields of his wife, and the fields assigned to the children
she bears, and informally he calls them his, although in fact they are not.
Even of the field which he inherits from his mother, its harvests he may
dispose of at will, but the field itself he may not. He may permit his son to
occupy it and gather its produce, but at the father's death, the son may
not own it, for then it passes to the father's sister's son or nearest
mother's kin, and thus our and houses always remain with our mother's
family.
According to the number of children a woman has, fields for them are
assigned to her, from some of the lands of her family group, and her
husband takes care of them. Hence our fields are numberous but small,
and several belonging to the same family may be close together, or they
may be miles apart, because arable localities are not continuous. There
are other reasons for the irregularity in size and situation of our family
lands, as interrupted sequence of inheritance caused by extinction of
families, but chiefly owing to the following condition, and to which we
especially invite your attention.
In the Spring and early Summer there usually comes from the Southwest
a succession of gales, oftentimes strong enough to blow away the sandy
soil from the face of some of our fields, and to expose the underlying clay,
which is hard, and sour, and barren; as the sand is the only fertile land,
when it moves, the planters must follow it, and other fields must be
provided in place of those which have been devastated. Sometimes
generations pass away and these barren spots remain, while in other
instances, after a few years, the winds have again restored the desirable
sand upon them. In such events its fertility is disclosed by the nature of
the grass and shrubs that grow upon it. If these are promising, a number
of us unite to clear off the land and make it again fit for planting, when it
may be given back to its former owner, or if a long time has elapsed, to
other heirs, or it may be given to some person of the same family group,
more in need of a planting place.
These limited changes in land holding are effected by mutual discussion
and concession among the elders, and among all the thinking men and
women of the family groups interested. In effect, the same system of
holding, and the same method of planting, obtain among the Tewa, and all
the Hopi villages, and under them we provide ourselves with food in
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94

This description leaves no doubt that the Hopis have a legal system
recognizing private property in land. 95
It offers a rich source for
comparative discussion of the role of gender in property rights, dividing
specific rights among different rights holders, and, especially, the
readjustment of property rights as environmental circumstances change.
A second perspective, a Lakota view of the land, portrays radical
differences with Anglo-American perspectives:
To the whitepeoples, land is ground; to the Lakota, land is earth. ... To
the Lakota land is the mother of all that lives, the source of life itself-a
living, breathing entity-quite literally a person. What does any person
call a living, breathing person who is the source of one's own life, but
mother. In the whitepeoples view, the concept of mother extends only to a
mother of the flesh. The Lakota view extends the concept to the mother of
earth-the source of all flesh. This Lakota view is not merely fanciful,
poetic, mystical, or mythical in the sense of false or untrue; the view can
be established as factual by criteria acceptable to the most scientificallyminded non-native scholar. Any soil engineer knows that the earth
breathes.
And any scientist will acknowledge that the earth is the
condition and source of life as we know it....
Both whitepeoples and the Lakota claim to 'love' the land and each
accuses the other of "wasting" it. Here are two peoples using the identical
doctrine, but who are poles apart in their interpretations of the same
idiom. Traditional Lakota disdain the whitepeoples' love-a love that
'wastes' the land by 'working' it: plowing, tilling digging, blasting, mining
it-all ways that facilitate the destruction of the ecological balance of
nature... The key word in English regarding land is yield. Each acre
must yield -crops, cattle, rent, etc. Any acre lying fallow or in a "state of
nature" is going to waste, according to most western thinking....
Land is reduced to an exploitable, fungible commodity, to be used up,
worked out, in short, 'developed.'
Ancillary to this notion of land as object, is the concept of land
exclusivity-a concept that the old plains peoples could not understand.
The idea is that one person or group of people can actually 'own' a piece of
land-now no longer called land, but 'property,' which that person or
people can then 'fence in,' and from which they lawfully can exclude all
others. This idea of exclusivity was as incomprehensible to the Lakota as
the idea that patches of air could be owned by different peoples. Land
ownership was as absurd a notion to the Lakota as the idea of paying
someone for oxygen rights.
In contrast to the whitepeople's objective, detached, exclusive view of land,

94. Id. at 249-50.
95. See Pat Sekaquaptewa, Evolving the Hopi Common Law, 9 Kan. J. L. & Pub. Poly. 761
(2000) (providing a current description of Hopi property law).
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the traditional Lakota view is subjective, interpenetrating, and inclusive.
It is subjective because land in our hearts simply is not substitutable or
compensable. One landscape definitely is not as good for oneself as
another landscape. One's land must be where the generations of the
nation have sprung from the earth, have lived, loved, suffered, and died,
and in which their bones rest. No other land can be so sweet, no other
land can be so strengthening, nurturing or comforting. When land is
taken from the Lakota, they lose the source of their eternal community,
their source of life, and their very identity. The hoop of the wico-ti is
broken, and the tiospaye scatter: the fabric of existence and identity is
weakened anew.96
From this Lakota view, land is far more than property. As Vine
Deloria, Jr. and Clifford Lytle argue, land-specifically the "special
place" revealed to the People by quasi-mythological figures in the
primordial mists-was imbued with spiritual meaning. 97 For the
Lakota, and for most indigenous peoples, land has been constitutive of
the identity of the people who lived upon it. Accordingly, when Indians
have denied that land could be alienated, they have done so in reference
to cessions outside the tribe, transfers which they have seen threaten
their very identities as peoples. This last view of property in land invites
a natural comparison with Margaret Jane Radin's work on the
relationship between property and the construction of personhood and
regarding property and market inalienability. 9 Indeed, as Unites States
judges and policymakers have struggled with developing a property
system to govern questions of ownership and markets in body parts and
in the resources and fruits of biomedical research, 99 so have Lakota
leaders struggled with and consistently opposed the imposition of a
property system for land in conflict with Lakota values. 0 0 Considering a
Lakota view of the land and its relationship to property law can help
students understand the connection between a society's values and the
property law by which it governs itself.

96. Robert Bunge, Lecture, Land is a feeling, adapted by Rory Fausett and printed in
Rory Fausett, Indigenous Americans and United States Law (unpublished class materials
prepared for Stanford Law School, Spring 1993). See generally Robert Bunge, An American
Urphilosophie(U. Press of Am. 1984).
97. Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of
American Indian Sovereignty 8-12 (U. of Tex. Press 1984). Every indigenous culture with
which I am at all familiar has some such place. For the Lakota, this place is Paha Sapa,
know by non-Indians as the Black Hills. See John Lavelle, Rescuing PahaSapa:Achieving
Environmental Justice by Restoring the Great Grasslands and Returning the Sacred Black
Hills to the GreatSioux Nation, 5 Great Plains Nat. Resource J. 40 (2001). For the Navajo,
it is Dinetah, in the northwestern comer of New Mexico. See Claudeen Arthur et al,
Between Sacred Mountains: Navajo Stories and Lessons from the Land (Sun Tracks and U.
of Ariz. Press 1986).
98. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1982);
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987).
99. See e.g. Moore v. Regents of the U. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
100. See generallyLavelle, supra n. 97.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001

17

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 4
538

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:521

Reasons to teach Indian law materials in the mainstream law
school curriculum are myriad. Those of use who teach and write about
Indian law want all our students to understand our nation's legal
history, the continuing struggle to find a principled basis for the
relationship among the federal government, states, and Indian tribes and
how our nation's power and the law have been deployed to colonize
Indian peoples. Yet even for the non-specialist and those less convinced
of the importance of Indian law, the subject offers useful pedagogical
benefits to teachers willing to include appropriate materials in their
classes. The first year Property class may well be where the potential
benefits are strongest. Incorporating Indian law materials encourages
students to consider how societies structure the rules governing land
and other property. Along the way, they cannot help but deepen their
understanding of how property serves to reflect those societies' values
and choices.
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